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NOTES 
Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the 
Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska 
In the recent case of Davis v. Alaska,1 the Supreme Court held 
that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment2 protects the 
ability of a criminal defendant to cross-examine a crucial govern-
ment witness for possible bias. Specifically, the Court found that a 
statute prohibiting the admission into evidence of juvenile records, 
which operated to prevent an effective cross-examination, violated 
the right of confrontation.3 Davis represents a continuation of a line 
of Supreme Court decisions finding violations of the right of con-
frontation in trial court evidentiary rulings.4 While it is not the first 
case holding that the right of confrontation guarantees more than a 
trial procedure allowing physical confrontation and some cross-
examination, 5 it is the first to base a determination that the right of 
confrontation was violated on an explicit examination of the efjec• 
1. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to • , • be confronted with the witnesses against him • • • ." Almost 
every state constitution has a similar provision. See 5 J. W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 
127-30 n.l (3d ed. 1940). 
In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the confrontation clause was incorporated 
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and thus made applicable 
to the states. Although two members of the unanimous court in Pointer disagreed with 
the incorporation analysis and would have reversed the petitioner's conviction on due 
process grounds, see the concurring opinions of Justices Harlan, 380 U.S. 400, 408, and 
Stewart, 380 U.S. 400, 409, it is today well settled that the confrontation clause applies 
to the states. See, e.g., Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Barber v. Page, 390 
U.S. 719 (1968); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 
363, 364 (1966); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. l, 3-4 {1966); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 415, 417-18 (1965). 
3. See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R. 3d 1112 (1975). 
4. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (discussed in the text at notes 
90-97 infra); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (limiting instructions cannot 
cure constitutional error of admitting into evidence confession of co-defendant who 
does not take the stand where confession implicates defendant); Smith v. Illinois, 390 
U.S. 129 (1968) (right of confrontation violated by permitting prosecution witness to 
conceal his true name and address where safety of witness not a factor); Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confrontation violated by introduction into evidence 
of preliminary hearing testimony of prosecution witness where defendant was not rep• 
resented by counsel at the preliminary hearing and did not cross-examine the witness); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (Pointer rule extended to cases in which defendant 
represented by counsel at preliminary hearing; requirement imposed that even where 
cross-examination takes place at preliminary hearing, state must make good-faith effort 
to produce witness at trial). 
5. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 
(1931). Cf. Note, Chambers v. Mississippi: Due Process and the Rules of Evidence, 35 
U. PITI, L. REv. 725, 735-36 (1974). Wigmore's view was that "[t]he Constitution does 
not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying declarations, or the like) 
shall be given infra-judicially, ••• but only what mode of procedure shall be fol-
lowed-i.e. a cross-examining procedure •••• " 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1397, 
at 131. 
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tiveness of a line of cross-examination. The implications and possible 
applications of Davis are broad, for by announcing that the con-
frontation clause guarantees a right of effective cross-examination° 
the decision necessarily expands appellate court (and collateral) 
review of the various limitations on cross-examination imposed by 
trial courts. 
This Note, first, examines the Davis methodology for determining 
whether a foreclosed line of cross-examination warrants protection 
by the confrontation clause, and suggests a test employable by review-
ing courts for making that determination. Then, the Note sketches 
the contours of the clash, prefigured by Davis, between the right of 
confrontation and the limitations on cross-examination that result 
from both the assertion of testimonial privileges and trial court 
relevance rulings. 
In the early morning hours of February 16, 1970, a bar in 
Anchorage, Alaska, was broken into and a safe containing a sub-
stantial amount of cash and checks was removed. The safe was dis-
covered that afternoon near the home of Jess Straight and his family. 
Straight's stepson, sixteen-year-old7 Richard Green, told police that 
he had seen and spoken with two men standing alongside an auto-
mobile near where the safe was subsequently discovered. Green re-
counted that he had observed one of the men, later identified by 
Green as Joshaway Davis, standing at the rear of the automobile with 
"something like a crowbar" in his hands. At the Anchorage police 
station the next day, Green made a photographic identification of 
Davis as one of the men he had encountered the day before, and 
two days later, picked Davis out of a lineup of seven black males. 
Davis was subsequently convicted of grand larceny and burglary; 
Green was a crucial prosecution witness at the trial. Green testified 
concerning the events that he had observed on the afternoon follow-
ing the burglary, and made an in-court identification of Davis. Both 
at the time of the burglary and of the trial, Green was on probation 
by order of a juvenile court after having been adjudicated a delin-
quent for participating in two burglaries. Before testimony was 
taken, the prosecutor moved for a protective order to prevent the 
defense from referring to Green's juvenile record in the course of 
cross-examination. In opposing the request for a protective order, 
Davis' counsel stated his intention to introduce Green's juvenile 
record to show bias8 rather than to call into question Green's good 
6. 415 U.S. at 318. 
7. Green was 16 years old on the day of the burglary, but had turned 17 by the 
time of Davis' trial. 415 U.S. at 311. 
8. Exposing the bias of a witness is one of several ways in which the credibility 
of a witness can be impeached. See note 34 infra. Bias can be shown by demonstrating 
motives of self-interest, such as fear of criminal liability, see People v. Dillwood, 106 
Cal. xvii (unreported), 39 P. 438 (1895), or desire for pecuniary gain, see Wheeler v, 
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character; the line of inquiry proposed by the defense was designed 
to demonstrate that Green might have made a hasty and faulty 
identification of the defendant in order to shift suspicion away from 
himself, or that he might have been "subject to undue pressure 
from the police and made his identifications under fear of possible 
probation revocation."9 On the basis of Alaska Rule of Children's 
Procedure 2310 and Section 47.10.0SO(g) of the Alaska Statutes,11 the 
trial court granted the motion for a protective order. The Alaska 
supreme court affirmed the conviction,12 concluding that it did not 
need to resolve the potential conflict between the defendant's right 
to a meaningful confrontation with adverse witnesses and the state's 
interest in protecting the anonymity of a juvenile offender because 
"our reading of the trial transcript convinces us that counsel for 
the defendant was able adequately to question the youth in con-
siderable detail concerning the possibility of bias or motive."13 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court started 
from the proposition expounded in an earlier decision that "the ex-
posure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important 
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examina-
tion."14 The Court disputed the Alaska supreme court's finding that 
"the cross-examination that was permitted defense counsel was ade-
quate to develop the issue of bias properly to the jury," because, the 
Court reasoned, although Davis' counsel was permitted to ask Green 
"whether" he was biased, he was not permitted to construct a record 
from which to argue "why" Green might have been biased:15 from 
the viewpoint of the jury, counsel might merely have been embark-
United States, 351 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1965), or by demonstrating emotional influences 
such as kinship for one party, see Williams v. State, 44 Ala. App. 503, 214 S.2d 712 
(1968), or hostility to another. See Fields v. State, 46 Fla. 84, 35 S. 185, 186 (1903). See 
generally McCoru.ncK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 40, at 78-81 (2d ed. E. 
Cleary 1972) [hereinafter McCORMICK]; 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 948-53 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1970). 
9. 415 U.S. at 311. 
IO. AI.As. R. CHILDREN'S P. 23 provides: "No adjudication, order, or disposition of a 
juvenile case shall be admissible in a court not acting in the exercise of juvei;iile juris-
diction except for use in a presentencing procedure in a criminal case where the 
superior court, in its discretion, determines that such use is appropriate." 
11. -AI.As. STAT. § 47.I0.080(g) (1971) provides: "The commitment and placement of 
a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against the 
minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court • • • ." 
12. Davis v. State, 499 P .2d 1025 (1972). 
13. 499 P.2d at 1036. 
14. 415 U.S. at 316-17, citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959). 
15. "On these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, 
defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which 
jurors • • • could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the 
witness. Petitioner was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination •••• " 415 
U.S. at 318 (emphasis added). 
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ing on a speculative "fishing" expedition.16 This restriction of effec-
tive cross-examination necessitated consideration whether the state's 
interest in preserving the anonymity of juvenile offenders was over-
riding. The Court concluded that the state's interest was "out-
weighed by [the] petitioner's right to probe into the influence of 
possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness."17 
While admitting the legitimacy of the state interest involved, the 
Court held that the state "cannot, consistent with the right of con-
frontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of vindi-
cating the State's interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal 
records."18 Justice Stewart's concurrence emphasized that the Court's 
holding was based on the importance of cross-examination directed 
at bias, and that "the Court neither holds nor suggests that the 
Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general 
credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his past 
delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions."19 Justice White, 
joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that "there is no 
constitutional principle at stake here. This is nothing more than 
a typical instance of a trial court exercising its discretion to control 
or limit cross-examination, followed by a typical decision of a state 
appellate court refusing to disturb the judgment of the trial court 
and itself concluding that limiting cross-examination had done no 
substantial harm to the defense."20 
Prior to Davis, the Supreme Court had made clear that the con-
frontation clause not only guarantees the right to cross-examine a 
witness with respect to his substantive testimony, but prohibits the 
proscription of all avenues of impeachment. Thus, in Alford v. 
United States,21 the Court reversed the defendant's conviction be-
cause the trial court had excluded cross-examination questions con-
cerning the place of residence of a crucial prosecution witness that 
were aimed at suggesting bias by uncovering that the witness was 
currently in jail: 
Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right .... Its permis-
sible purposes, among others, are that the witness may be identified 
with his community so that independent testimony may be sought 
and offered of his reputation for veracity in his own neighborhood 
•.. that the jury may interpret his testimony in the light reflected 
upon it by knowledge of his environment . . . and that facts may 
16. 415 U.S. at 318. 
17. 415 U.S. at 319. 
18. 415 U.S. at 319-20. 
19. 415 U.S. at 321. 
20. 415 U.S. at 321. 
21. 282 U.S. 687 (1931). 
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be brought out tending to discredit the witness by showing that his 
testimony in chief was untrue or biased . 
. . . The question ... was not only an appropriate preliminary 
to the cross-examination of the ·witness, but on its face ... was an 
essential step in identifying the witness with his environment.22 
The Court concluded that "[while t]he extent of cross-examination 
with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court . . . [here] the trial court cut off in 
limine all inquiry on a subject with respect to which the defense 
was entitled to a reasonable cross-examination. This was an abuse 
of discretion and prejudicial error."28 Since Alford invoved a federal 
criminal trial, the decision rested on abuse of discretion rather than 
on the constitutional right to cross-examine. But, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Davis, "the constitutional dimension of our holding 
in Alford is not in doubt."24 In Smith v. Illinois,25 the Court relied 
on Alford to reverse on similar grounds a state criminal conviction.26 
Because Davis involved a limitation on, rather than total prohi-
bition of, impeachment cross-examination, the decision goes beyond 
both Smith and Alford. The Court's inquiry into whether Davis 
had been precluded from engaging in effective cross-examination 
was essentially tw'Ofold. The Court first determined whether the ex-
cluded line of questioning warranted constitutional protection. 
Upon finding that it did, the Court scrutinized the trial transcript 
to determine whether the trial court had permitted sufficient ques-
tioning for an effective cross-examination.27 The examination of the 
excluded line of questioning considered three factors: the goal of the 
questions, their probative value, and the importance of the witness' 
direct testimony. In Davis these factors were highly significant; bias 
is an extremely effective means of impeachment,28 Green's proba-
22. 282 U.S. at 691-93. 
23. 282 U.S. at 694. 
24, 415 U.S. at 318 n.6. 
25. 390 U.S. 129 (1968). 
26. In Smith, the petitioner had been convicted of the illegal sale of narcotics. The 
principal witness against him was the purchaser, who admitted on cross-examination 
that he was testifying under an alias. When defense counsel asked the witness what 
his correct name and address were, the trial court ruled that the witness was not 
required to answer. Reversing petitioner's conviction, the Court held that "the right of 
an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him must be determined by the 
same standards whether the right is denied in a federal or state proceeding •• , ." 390 
U.S. at 133, quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1965). The Court then 
determined that the Alford standard must be adhered to in state prosecutions. 
27. See 415 U.S. at 312-14. 
28. The Davis Court compared the use of criminal convictions to attack a lvitness' 0 
veracity with an attack on a witness by showing bias, and referred to the latter as 
"[a] more particular attack ••• 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting 
1470 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:1465 
tionary status strongly suggested a motive to Iie,20 and Green was 
the most crucial prosecution witness.80 While the compelling nature 
of these factors in Davis makes difficult the prediction of their rela-
tive importance for future cases, there is little reason to limit the 
Davis result to situations where the factors are equally compelling. 
Although language in Davis suggests that bias is more protected 
than some other forms of impeachment,81 it seems unwarranted to 
interpret the case, as some courts have,82 to mean that only cross-
examination directed at bias is sufficiently important to require 
constitutional protection. First, on the facts of Davis, bias impeach-
ment was clearly the most effective technique and the only impeach-
ment form attempted. And second, a focus on bias to the exclusion 
of all other lines of impeachment does not fully protect the defen-
dant's right to "show that [the Government's case] is untrue.''88 As 
the Court noted, cross-examination involves discrediting a witness' 
veracity as well as testing his perceptions and memory.84 Impeach-
the weight of his testimony.'" 415 U.S. at 316, quoting 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, 
§ 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). 
29. See 415 U.S. at 317-19. 
30. See 415 U.S. at 317. Other courts have refrained from applying Davis where 
the witness involved merely gave corroboratory testimony. See United States v. Duhart, 
511 F.2d 7, 9 (6th Cir. 1975); Mutscher v. State, 514 S.W.2d 905, 921 (Tex. Ct. Crim. 
App. 1974). 
31. See, e.g., the Court's reference to "so vital a constitutional right as the effective 
cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." 415 U.S. at 320. See also 415 U.S. at 
321 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
32. See Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alas.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974): 
State v. Williams, 309 S.2d !303, 304-05 (La. 1975); State v. Burr, 525 P.2d 1067 (Or. App, 
1974); Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458, 465 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1974). 
Both Gonzales and Burr involved attempts to use a witness' juvenile record to 
attack his character for truth and veracity; in neither case did the court hold that 
the impeachment was constitutionally required. In Gonzales the court stated: 
The attempted impeachment here was of general credibility by proof of prior 
"convictions." The probative value of this type of evidence is considerably less 
than that which suggests false or distorted testimony because of bias. The need 
to confront a witness with such evidence is correspondingly less ••• , 
It is apparent then that juvenile adjudications which are ••• directed solely 
at general credibility rather than bias, are generally not sufficiently probative to 
create a genuine conflict with the defendant's right of confrontation. 
521 P.2d at 514-15. 
33. 415 U.S. at 317 n.4. 
34. See 415 U.S. at !316. The two main functions of cross-examination arc the 
elicitation of additional facts that might qualify or explain the witness' direct testimony, 
and impeachment, which sheds light on the credibility of the testimony generally 
through the injection of matters not related to the factual issues of the case. See 
generally McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 21, at 46-49, §§ 33-49. In states following the 
"wide-open" rule of cross-examination, the cross-examiner may bring out matters that 
tend to elucidate any issue in the case, even though not dealt with on direct exam-
ination. See id. § 21, at 46-49. 
There are four traditional avenues of impeachment, each producing a slightly 
different implication. One method is to show that the witness has previously made a 
statement inconsistent with a statement made during the trial. The goal is not to 
insinuate that the testimony is false and the previous story true, but to imply that the 
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ment is highly .valued because it protects the innocent defendant 
who is unable to demonstrate his innocence affirmatively and who 
must therefore convince the fact finder of the falsity of the prosecu-
tion's testimony. The Court spoke of the high degree of relevance 
and effectiveness of bias impeachment, but other impeachment tech-
niques often provide more effective means of discrediting witnesses. 
For example, evidence of prior inconsistent statements is highly 
damaging to a witness' credibility and has been thought to produce 
at least as much impact on a jury as cross-examination directed at 
bias.35 In other situations a defendant's best line of attack on a wit-
ness' credibility might be to disclose a prior perjury conviction.36 
The existence of a constitutional violation should depend not upon 
an evaluation of the abstract probativeness of a particular type of 
impeachment, but upon whether the defendant was prevented from 
employing a means of impeachment that would have been effective 
in his case. 
Like the Court's discussion of bias, its discussion of Green's 
status as an indispensable witness need not be construed to mean 
that cross-examination of less important witnesses can never be con-
stitutionally protected. Rather, the Court's emphasis on the critical 
nature of Green's testimony suggests only that if testimony is not 
necessary for conviction, its restriction will not constitute a denial of 
effective cross-examination. 
It is of course arguable that, because the confrontation clause 
applies to all ·witnesses whose testimony is introduced against the 
defendant, the cross-examination of all witnesses should be consti-
tutionally protected. Support for this proposition might be found in 
the Court's summary disposition of the argument that a violation of 
inconsistency raises doubts about the reliability of the witness in general. See id. §§ 34-
39. Another method of impeachment is to show that the witness is biased (i.e., has a 
motive to lie), and therefore might be intentionally lying. See id. § 40, at 78-81; 3A 
J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 948-53 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). A third method of im• 
peachment is to demonstrate that the witness' character for truth and veracity falls 
short of general community standards, often accomplished by showing prior acts of 
misconduct thought to have a bearing on a person's character for truth and veracity, 
See McCORMICK, supra, §§ 41-44; 3A J. WIGMORE, supra, §§ 977-88; note 105 infra. As 
the Davis Court stated: "One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence 
of a prior criminal conviction of that witness. By so doing the cross-examiner intends 
to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness' character is such that he would be 
less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony." 415 U.S. 
at 316. A fourth means of impeachment is to show a defect in the witness' capacity to 
observe, remember or recount the matters to which he testified. See McCORMICK, supra, 
§ 45, at 93-97. 
35. McCoRMICK, supra note 8, § 33, at 66. At least two courts have applied Davis to 
impeachment through the introduction of prior inconsistent statements. See State in 
the Interest of A.S., a Juvenile, 130 N.J. Super. 388, 392, 327 A.2d 260, 262 (Juv. & 
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1974); State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d, 164, 170-72 (N.D. 1974). 
36. See note 105 infra. 
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the defendant's right of confrontation might be harmless error:87 
The Court stated that the denial of "the right to effective cross• 
examination . . . 'would be constitutional error of the first mag-
nitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure 
it.' "38 However, even on a broad reading of Davis, it is clear that 
the Court was not proscribing all cross-examination restrictions, 
regardless of prejudicial effect. At one point the Court implied that 
if Green's testimony had provided no "link in the proof" of Davis' 
conviction, reversal would not have been warranted.80 Moreover, 
in other contexts the Court has suggested that where a denial of 
cross-examination constitutes a "mere minor lapse," reversal is not 
required,40 and in other confrontation cases the Court has applied 
the harmless error rule.41 Thus, the Davis Court undoubtedly re-
fused to apply the harmless error rule not because it felt that all 
lines of cross-examination of all witnesses were equally protected by 
the confrontation clause, but because in finding a denial of effective 
cross-examination, the Court had already concluded that it was not 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Green's testimony was not 
necessary. 
In addition to the determination whether an excluded line of 
cross-examination warrants constitutional protection, Davis also re-
quires a careful scrutiny of the trial transcript to ascertain whether 
37. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 37!, U.S. 
85 (1963) (by implication), which sanction affirmance of a conviction despite constitu-
tional error if such error is demonstrably "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
38. 415 U.S. at 318. 
39. Cf. 415 U.S. at 317, quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965). 
Where no prejudice to the defendant's case results from a denial of cross-examination 
there is little need for a reversal. In this regard the situation is unlike fourth amend-
ment violations where a prophylactic rule is applied because of society's need to deter 
improper police conduct. Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967), 
40. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). In Douglas the prosecution read 
in the presence of the jury the purported confessions of the petitioner's alleged ac-
complice under the guise of impeaching the accomplice, who repeatedly asserted his 
fifth amendment privilege in response to the prosecution's questions. The Court found 
that the defendant's inability to cross-examine the alleged accomplice about the pur-
ported confession, which the Court noted may well have been treated by the jury as 
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, denied the defendant the right of cross-
examination protected by the confrontation clause. The Court noted that "[t]his case 
cannot be characterized as one where the prejudice in the denial of the right of 
cross-examination constituted a mere minor lapse •••• " 380 U.S. at 420. 
41. For example, in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), the Court lteld 
that a denial of cross-examination in violation of the rule of Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123 (1968) (discussed in note 4 supra), was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
because "the case against Harrington was ••• overwhelming •••• " 395 U.S. at 254. 
Other cases have also applied the harmless error rule to violations of Bruton. See 
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). 
See also United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 296 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
974 (1972); United States v. Duhart, 511 F.2d 7, 8-9 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Feldman, 136 F.2d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 1943); Best v. United States, 328 A.2d 378, 383 
(D.C. App. 1974). 
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the permitted cross-examination was "effective." In Davis the Court 
found determinative the fact that while the defendant was per-
mitted to inquire whether the witness was biased, the trial court's 
restrictions prevented him from documenting why the witness might 
be biased.42 
Clearly, the above-discussed factors considered in Davis are in-
sufficient to constitute a test by which to determine whether a trial 
court ruling has precluded effective cross-examination. Until fur-
ther guidance is forthcoming, lower courts have the opportunity to 
consider the reach of the Davis doctrine. In this regard, the following 
test for the review of trial court rulings is proposed: constitutionally 
protected cross-examination has been precluded by a particular re-
striction unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) that the 
defendant would have been convicted without the witness' testimony, 
or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened 
the impact of the witness' testimony.43 Under this test, where a wit-
ness' testimony has provided no "link in the proof" and thus could 
not have contributed to the verdict, or where it is certain that the 
defendant's proposed line of inquiry would not have yielded the 
hoped-for result,44 a restriction on cross-examination would not deny 
the defendant effective cross-examination. On the other hand, if the 
witness' testimony was crucial, the defendant was unable to document 
fully why the witness should not be believed, and the reviewing 
court cannot be sure that the excluded inquiry would have been 
fruitless, effective cross-examination was denied. The determination 
that effective cross-examination was denied does not necessarily 
mean that the defendant's confrontation right was violated, for a 
court must then decide whether a countervailing state intetest was 
"paramount to" the defendant's right to cross-examine in the par-
ticular case. While brief, the balancing of interests employed in 
making this determination in Davis is nevertheless instructive. This 
Note applies the Court's methodology, first, to evaluate the state 
interests underlying privileged communications, and second, to 
gauge the state interests behind relevance rulings. 
The Davis Court treated the statute protecting the witness' 
juvenile record, which kept out concededly relevant information in 
order to "preserve the anonymity of a juvenile offender,"46 essen-
tially as a privilege.46 The decision thus provides some guidance for 
42. See 415 U.S. at 318. 
43. This test is suitable for use by an appellate court, not a trial court. To avoid 
reversal, a trial judge should err on the side of admitting too much evidence rather 
than too little. Cf. McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 29, at 59. 
44. See State v. Williams, 309 S.2d 303, 304 (La. 1975). 
45. 415 U.S. at 319. 
46. Although AI.As. STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971) does not specifically mention a privi-
lege, the protection it creates operates similar to a privilege. The statute frees the 
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those occasions when other privileges obstruct the right to confront 
-guidance much needed because courts so far have resolved the con-
flicts between a defendant's right of confrontation and a witness' 
assertion of a testimonial privilege with little conceptual clarity.47 
Testimonial privileges are granted in various situations. For 
example, the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person .•. shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
Other privileges are granted to protect various kinds of communi-
witness from disclosing his juvenile record in court not because his juvenile record 
lacks probative worth with respect to his credibility, but in order to protect a state 
interest-the state's rehabilitative goals-which might be impaired by the disclosure. 
See 415 U.S. at 319. Since the operation of the statute and the operation of a privilege 
are so similar, it would not be incorrect to view the statute as creating a privilege pro, 
tecting an individual from disclosure of his juvenile record. 
47. See, e.g., People v. Mobley, 390 Mich. 5'1, 210 N.W.2d 327 (1973). In Mobley, 
when a co-defendant who was not being tried jointly with the defendant asserted 
his fifth amendment privilege on cross-examination, the trial court permitted the privi, 
lege to be asserted. The Michigan supreme court reversed, holding that because the 
witness was a co-defendant, he had waived his privilege against self-incrimination by 
taldng the stand. Thus, the court confused the waiver of the privilege by a defendant, 
who waives the privilege by taking the stand, with the waiver of the privilege by a 
witness, who waives 'the privilege only by testifying about the incriminating subject 
matter. See also United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 
822 (1963), where, in deciding whether the assertion of a privilege by a government 
witness on cross-examination violated a defendant's right to confront, the court ex, 
amined whether the inquiry merely foreclosed "collateral" matters dealing only with 
the credibility of witnesses. However, impeachment of witnesses is part of the consti• 
tutional right to cross-examine. See text at notes 21-27 supra. For other cases applying 
the Cardillo rule see United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1974); United 
States v. Rogers, 475 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Birrell, 447 F.2d 1168 
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972); Fountain v. United States, 384 F,2d 
624 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968); United States v. Collier, 362 
F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1966); Coil v. United States, 343 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1965). 
Prior to Davis, the Court twice, in dicta, declined to provide any guidance in this 
area. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the Court found a violation of the 
defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor where a statute disqualifying persons charged as principals, 
accomplices, or accessories in the same crime from testifying for one another prevented 
the defendant from calling an exculpatory witness. In a footnote to the majority 
opinion, the Court noted that "[n]othing in this opinion should be construed as 
disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination or 
the lawyer-client or husband-wife privileges, which are based on entirely different 
considerations ••• ," 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), 
the defendant argued that his right of confrontation was violated by the failure of a 
trial judge to permit him to elicit from a police officer the name of an informer on 
cross-examination. Dismissing the defendant's argument, the Court noted that "it 
would follow from this argument that no witness on cross-examination could ever 
constitutionally assert a testimonial privilege •••• We have never given the Sixth 
Amendment such a construction and we decline to do so now." 386 U.S. at 314. One 
commentator has taken the position that the right of a defendant to present exculpatory 
witnesses, guaranteed by the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment, 
would be violated whenever the assertion of a privilege makes exculpatory testimony 
unavailable. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, '13 MICH, L. REv. 73, 160-77 
(1974). 
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cations for which confidentiality is viewed as essential.48 Disclosure 
of such privileged communications may not be made in legal pro-
ceedings ·without the acquiescence of the holder of the privilege. 
Privileges are granted to communications between an attorney and 
client,49 husband and wife,50 priest and penitent,51 physician and 
patient,52 psychotherapist and patient,53 journalist and source,54 ac-
countant and client,55 and those in other confidential relationships.56 
48. Wigmore recognizes four fundamental conditions as necessary for the establish-
ment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered, and 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the commu-
nications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct dis-
posal of litigation. 
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis original). 
Of course, the determination that the injury to the relation is greater than the benefit 
to the litigation from disclosure is made generally, not on a case-by-case basis. 
Circumstances can easily be imagined in which constitutionally protected cross-
examination would be obstructed by the assertion of a privilege. For example, where 
a witness gives incriminating testimony against a defendant, the defendant: might want 
to show that statements were made by the witness to his wife that contradict his 
testimony. Such evidence would be highly damaging to the witness' credibility and 
thus highly useful to the defendant, yet might not be admitted because the husband 
could invoke his privilege against the disclosure of marital communications. Similarly, 
a defendant wishing to establish the bias of an adverse witness by showing that he is 
guilty of an outstanding criminal charge and is testifying in the hope of receiving 
lenient treatment might be barred by an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege. 
See, e.g., State v. Montanez, 215 Kan. 67, 523 P.2d 410 (1974), where the defendant tried 
to show the bias of a key government witness resulting from fear of prosecution for 
the sale of narcotics. When the witness asserted his fifth amendment privilege, the 
court, relying on Davis, struck his testimony. 
49. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Mc-
Co!UlnCK, supra note 8, § 87, at 175. 
50. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2232, at 642 (McNaughton rev. 1961); McCOR• 
MICK, supra note 8, § 79, at 163. It is the communicating spouse who is the holder of the 
privilege. Id. § 83, at 169. Even if the parties have become separated or divorced by 
the time of trial, the privilege survives as to communications made during the mar-
riage. Id. § 85, at 171-72. 
51. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2395, at 873 n.l (McNaughton rev. 1961); 
McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 77, at 158 n.42. 
52. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2380, at 819 n.5 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 
McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 98, at 212. 
53. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2286, at 534 n.23 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 
McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 77, at 158 n.43.' 
54. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2286, at 532 n.21 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 
McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 77, at 159 n.44. 
55. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2286, at 533 n.22 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
56. For example, statutes cover confidential clerks and stenographers, see 8 J. WIG• 
MORE, supra note 2, § 2286, at 535 n.24 (McNaughton rev. 1961), and communications 
between social worker and client. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CooE § 1010 (West 1970) (clinical 
social worker); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (social worker-client 
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In addition, privileges are granted that protect primarily govern-
mental interests, such as the privileges for information dealing with 
national security,57 for presidential communications,08 and for confi-
dential government personnel files.59 
Although the purposes and beneficiaries of privileges vary, all 
privileges involve, to some degree, the protection of state interests. 
Clearly, governmental privileges for executive and national security 
communications protect state interests rather than the interests of the 
individuals who assert them. But state interests also underlie privi-
leges that protect private parties. For example, privileges allowing 
the government to withhold the identity of informers,00 and per-
mitting a witness not to reveal his address when to do so would 
endanger his safety,61 simultaneously protect the individuals in-
volved and further governmental interests by encouraging citizen 
privilege). One state even creates a testimonial privilege for information concerning 
illegitimate birth learned by participants in certain probate proceedings. See MICH. 
COMP, LAWS ANN. § 326.12 (Supp. 1975). 
57. See United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 
920 (1952). 
58. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
59. See, e.g., People v. Sumpter, 75 Misc. 2d 55, 347 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
60. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the informer privilege in Roviaro v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). The Court rejected the approach of three courts of 
appeals, see Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. 
Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952): Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th 
Cir. 1947), which had required that the privilege yield "whenever the informer's 
testimony may be relevant and helpful to the accused's defense," 353 U.S. at 61·62, 
and substituted a test "balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of informa-
tion against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance 
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each 
case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible 
significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors." 353 U.S. at 62, 
Applying this test, the Court reversed Roviaro's conviction because the circumstances 
indicated that the informant might have been a material witness in Roviaro's defense. 
Although the Roviaro situation may seem analogous to Davis, there was no violation 
of the right of confrontation in Roviaro, since neither the informer's testimony nor 
his hearsay statements were introduced into evidence at Roviaro's trial. See McCray v. 
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313-14 (1967). The constitutional error in Roviaro dealt with the 
accused's right to present his defense. See Westen, supra note 47, at 164•65. 
61. See, e.g., United States v. LaBarbera, 463 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972); United 
States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971); 
United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); 
United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970); 
United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1969); 
United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Smith v. Illinois, 890 
U.S. 129, 133-34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) ("In Alford v. United States •• , the 
Court recognized that questions which tend merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate a 
witness may go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination. I would place in the 
same category those inquiries which tend to endanger the personal safety of the wit• 
ness"). 
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participation in the criminal process.62 State interests also underlie 
the communications privileges, which exclude possibly relevant evi-
dence in order to protect relationships regarded as of "sufficient 
social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of 
facts needed in the administration of justice.''63 The fifth amendment 
privilege, although primarily protecting the individual from the 
power of the state, similarly protects state interests.64 
Davis and earlier cases suggest the degree of scrutiny to which 
these various state interests should be subjected when they conflict 
with a defendant's right to confront. Prior to Davis, the Supreme 
Court noted that the "denial or significant diminution [ of the right 
to confront and to cross-examine] calls into question the ultimate 
'integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the competing 
interest be closely examined."65 While not explicitly engaging in 
strict scrutiny, the Court in Davis clearly subjected the state interest 
to more than a superficial examination: rather than merely deter-
mining whether the statutory prohibition on disclosure of juvenile 
criminal records was rationally related to the state's interest in re-
habilitation, the Court independently evaluated the state's need for 
that prohibition. Disagreeing with the state's argument that expo-
sure of the witness' juvenile record might "encourage the juvenile 
offender to commit further acts of delinquency, or cause the juvenile 
offender to lose employment opportunities or otherwise suffer un-
necessarily,"66 the Court asserted that the disclosure of Green's 
record would only result in "temporary embarrassment ... to Green 
62. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957): 
What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the Govern-
ment's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish 
information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that 
law •••• The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the 
public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obliga-
tion of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to 
law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to 
perform that obligation. 
63, McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 72, at 152 (footnote omitted). For example, the 
policy behind the attorney-client privilege is that "[i]n order to promote freedom of 
consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by 
the legal advisers must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure 
except on the client's consent." 8 J. W1cMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 545 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961). 
64. The interests of the state include assuring that even guilty individuals are 
treated in a manner consistent with human dignity by preventing torture and other 
inhumane treatment, encouraging respect for and protecting the dignity of the judi-
cial system, and contributing to a fair state-individual balance by requiring that the 
government leave alone an individual until good cause is shown to disturb him. See 
McCORllfiCK, supra note 8, § ll8, at 252-53; 8 J. W1cMoRE, supra note 2, § 2251, at 
315-18 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
65. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973), quoting Berger v. California, 
393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969). 
66. 415 U.S. at 319. 
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or his family." 67 Without questioning the legitimacy or wisdom of 
the state interest, the Court in effect examined and found consti-
tutionally insufficient the nexus in this instance between the asser-
tion of the privilege and the protection of the state interest. 
The state policy behind most privileges, however, is more se-
verely damaged by disclosure. For example, forced disclosure of 
attorney-client communications frustrates the state's interest in 
encouraging candid revelations to attorneys, since decreased candor 
would inevitably result if clients were forced to weigh the disad-
vantages of incomplete disclosure against the possibility that their 
confidential statements would be made public. Thus, if Davis in-
structs to look only to how necessary the privilege is to the protection 
of the underlying state interest, no denial of effective cross-exami-
nation resulting from the assertion of the attorney-client privilege 
would ever constitute a violation of the defendant's right of con-
frontation. 
But there are several clear indications in Davis that a defendant's 
constitutional rights are violated when any privilege is asserted to 
deny effective cross-examination, regardless of the strength of the 
nexus between that assertion and the state interest underlying the 
privilege. The Court found that, while legitimate, the state's interest 
in protecting the juvenile could not require forfeiture of the consti• 
tutional right of confrontation, because "the State cannot, consistent 
with the right to confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the 
full burden of vindicating the State's interest in the secrecy of juve-
nile criminal records."68 Thus, since the burden of any privilege 
falls with equal weight on the defendant, and the likelihood of 
injury to the defendant does not vary with the importance of the 
privilege or the degree to which it fosters the relevant state policy, 
the assertion of any privilege violates the defendant's right to con-
front where it deprives him of "effective cross-examination." More-
over, the Court noted that the conflict in Davis could properly be 
avoided through a prosecutorial choice between the two state in-
terests involved-the interest in the assertion of the privilege and 
the interest in the prosecution of the defendant. The Court appar-
ently viewed as unfair the state's attempt to satisfy these two interests 
simultaneously at the expense of the defendant's right to confron-
tation, and arguably required that the state choose which interest 
to protect.69 Again, regardless of which privilege is asserted, the state 
67. 415 U.S. at 319. 
68. 415 U.S. at 320. 
69. At least two decisions have required that the government either produce priv-
ileged information or forgo prosecution. In United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 502 
(2d Cir. 1944), the accused were found guilty of conspiracy. On appeal, several of 
the defendants, who were inspectors of the Treasury Department's "Alcohol Tax 
Unit," challenged the exclusion at trial of certain official reports of an exculpatory 
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has the option of protecting the interest underlying the privilege by 
refraining from using the witness to make out its case. 
These indications support reading Davis for the proposition that 
where the assertion of a privilege by a ·witness would foreclose the 
defendant from continuing a constitutionally protected line of in-
quiry, the privilege must yield. 
Of course, a state need not exert its power to withdraw the privi-
lege in every case of conflict. Often a less restrictive altemative70 will 
be available that will allow the defendant to cross-examine without 
forcing the state to forgo the benefits from the assertion of the 
privilege. The most obvious instance in which a less restrictive 
alternative is available is when the fifth amendment privilege is 
asserted. A grant of use immunity71 both enables the government 
nature that they had prepared for their supervisors while in the employ of the 
government. The clearly relevant reports were excluded pursuant to Article 80 of 
Regulation 12 of the Treasury Department: "Whenever a subpoena shall have been 
served upon them, they will, unless otherwise expressly directed, appear in Court 
and answer thereto and respectfully decline to produce the records or give testimony 
called for on the ground of being prohibited therefrom, from the regulations of the 
Treasury Department. Officers disobeying these instructions will be dismissed from 
the service and may incur criminal liability." In requiring that the government choose 
between keeping the documents secret and going forward with the prosecution, the 
court, per Judge Learned Hand, stated: "[I']he prosecution necessarily ends any 
confidential character the [privileged] documents may possess; it must be conducted 
in the open, and will lay bare their subject matter. The government must choose; 
either it must leave the transaction in the obscurity from which a trial will draw 
them, or it must expose them fully." 142 F.2d at 506. In United States v. Coplon, 
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), also decided by Judge Hand, the defendant was con-
victed of crimes relating to espionage. The government admitted having made wire-
taps of the accused, but asserted that neither information derived from the wiretaps 
nor its fruits had been used in the prosecution of the defendant. In support of 
this assertion the government submitted the wiretap records in camera to the trial 
judge, but the records were not disclosed to the defense. Reversing the conviction, 
the court of appeals held that it was error to deny the defendant an opportunity 
to demonstrate that the wiretaps had led to evidence used against her. The court 
cited Andolschek as mandating that "the prosecution must decide whether the public 
prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished was greater than the disclosure 
of sucl1 'state secrets' as might be relevant to the defence [sic]." 185 F.2d at 638. 
70. See Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An 
Analysis, A Justification, And Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 972 (1974) C'the 
doctrine requires that a state not employ a specific means to accomplish an admit-
tedly legitimate purpose if it has available alternative means that are less restrictive 
upon some individual interest"). 
71. Two types of immunity may be granted: transactional inlmunity and use im-
munity. Transactional inlmunity accords full immunity from· prosecution for the 
offense to which the compelled testimony relates. Use immunity merely prevents the 
government from employing against the witness the compelled testimony and evidence 
derived directly therefrom; the government remains free to prosecute the witness on 
the basis of independently obtained evidence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970). In 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the 
compulsion of testimony following a grant of use immunity does not violate the fifth 
amendment. The Court found that use inlmunity guarantees adequate safeguards to 
the witness because in order to prosecute the witness, the government must show 
that the evidence used is not tainted but is instead derived from an independent 
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to force the witness to testify and protects the witness from being 
compelled to incriminate himself, without preventing the govern. 
ment from subsequently prosecuting the witness.72 
A less restrictive alternative that will not run afoul of Davis may 
also satisfy the state interests underlying other privileges. Where 
the purpose of a confidential communications privilege is to en-
courage disclosures relating to the civil or criminal liability of the 
communicant, a court could require that the recipient of the com-
munication answer the inquiry into the privileged area if it is pos• 
sible to ensure simultaneously that the communicant retains the 
advantages of the privilege.73 Such accommodation is possible with 
respect to the attorney-client privilege when disclosures concerning 
the guilt or innocence of the client are involved. The court could 
compel disclosure from the attorney, thus satisfying the defendant's 
right of confrontation, while immunizing the disclosures from use 
in criminal and civil proceedings to which the client is a party.74 
legitimate source. The Court noted that "[t]his burden of proof • • • is not limited 
to a negation of taint; rather • • • , it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative 
duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 406 U.S. at 460. See also Westen, 
supra note 47, at 166-70. 
72. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972), discussed in note '11 
supra. Although in order to prosecute the witness subsequently the government must 
affirmatively show that its evidence was gathered from sources independent of the 
compelled testimony, any inconvenience resulting from this burden may be minimized 
by granting a continuance to gather evidence against the witness before compelling 
him to testify. See Westen, supra note 4'7, at 169-70. Because of the availability of 
use immunity, the state's interest in the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege 
by a witness presumably is no greater than its interest in withholding use immunity, 
The latter interest is not compelling, since after a grant of use immunity the prose, 
cution is in no worse position with respect to the prosecution of the witness than 
it was prior to the grant. See id. at 169. 
73. See Westen, supra note 47, at 172-73. 
'14. See id. at 172-73, arguing in favor of the above limitation in connection with 
the clash between a testimonial privilege and the compulsory process clause of the 
sixth amendment: "The state's interest in encouraging candor can be substantially 
served by guaranteeing the client that his communications, if disclosed, will never 
be used against him in civil or criminal proceedings. The added benefits to the 
client of complete secrecy are insufficient to justify a burden on the defendant's 
constitutional right •••• To apply the privilege that broadly is unnecessary and, 
therefore, unconstitutional." The ability of this modification of the attorney-client 
privilege to protect the client fully against the use of his confidential disclosures 
in a subsequent civil case is unclear. Although potential plaintiffs may still bring 
civil suits against the client, full protection to the client would require that the 
plaintiff show, before introducing evidence related to the disclosures, that the evi• 
dence offered came from sources independent of the compelled disclosure. But this 
showing may be difficult or impossible in some situations, especially since the plain• 
tiff may have had no knowledge of the compelled disclosure and thus no reason to 
record the sources from which his evidence was derived. To the extent that it 
deprives third parties of a cause of action, the proposed modification may be invalid 
as a deprivation of property without due process of law under the fourteenth amend• 
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Similar analysis can be applied to the physician-patient75 and marital 
communications privileges, although a use immunity alternative may 
be ineffective where a privilege, such as the priest-penitent privilege, 
protects disclosures that are socially embarrassing rather than legally 
incriminating. 
Not all privileges are amenable to a less restrictive alternative. 
In these instances, Davis dictates that the privilege cannot be as-
serted if the effect would be to curtail effective cross-examination. 
While the state may decide to have its witness testify without the 
privilege, in many situations the state may conclude that its interests 
are better served in the long run by forgoing a particular witness' 
testimony than by frustrating the interest protected by the privilege. 
The importance of the state interest, the degree to which the privi-
lege serves this interest and the importance of the witness to the 
prosecution's case may properly be taken into account in making 
this determination; all that the confrontation clause requires is that 
the privilege not be asserted at the expense of the right to confront. 
An example of a "difficult" case, in which there is a strong nexus 
between the assertion of the privilege and the protection of the state 
interest and in which there is available no less restrictive alternative, 
is the situation where a witness refuses to divulge her address on 
cross-examination on the ground that to do so would endanger her 
safety. The state's interest in encouraging witnesses to testify in 
criminal cases is seriously impaired by disclosure of the witness' 
address: the witness may suffer recriminations and future witnesses 
may refrain from cooperating with law-enforcement officials. On the 
other hand, permitting nondisclosure of the witness' address seri-
ously undercuts the defendant's right to learn the identity of the 
witness.76 While no court has forced a witness to reveal her address 
when the government could show danger to her safety, the relevant 
decisions generally proceed to great lengths to demonstrate that the 
defendant, although ignorant of the witness' current address, was able 
ment. The violation of due process may be avoided by placing the burden of proof 
on the defendant to show that the plaintiff's evidence was derived from the forced 
disclosure. But this burden would be extremely difficult if not impossible to satisfy 
in most instances. Arguably, then, this modification should not be considered a less 
restrictive alternative. However, even if a less restrictive alternative is not available, 
the attorney-client privilege would nevertheless have to yield to the right of confron-
tation. See text at notes 68-69 supra. 
75, It has been argued, however, that the assertion of the physician-patient privi-
lege during cross-examination in criminal cases occurs so seldom that its application 
does nothing to advance the goal of encouraging disclosures to physicians. See Westen, 
supra note 47, at 171. 
76. See United States v. Alford, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931) (ignorance of the witness' 
address may deny the defendant access to "an essential step in identifying the witness 
with his environment'). 
1482 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 73:1465 
to attack the witness' credibility adequately.77 These decisions imply 
that if the withholding of a current address truly foreclosed the 
defendant from making a meaningful attack on a witness' credibility, 
a court might find a violation of the right to confront78-a result 
that accords with the forgoing analysis of Davis. 
To be sure, cases supporting the power of a trial court to exclude 
hearsay evidence indicate that the right of confrontation must at 
times yield to paramount state interests.79 But these decisions do not 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 1040 (1972) ("It is note-i\l'orthy, though not dispositive • • • that the restric• 
tion did not prevent the defendant from extensively exploring the character of witness 
Schang • • • • Schang's sordid background was exposed to the jury in substantial 
detail, and while we cannot say that the full extent of his disreputability was re• 
vealed, we believe that whatever prejudice to the defendant resulted from the llmi• 
tations imposed by the trial judge was outweighed by the necessity of protecting the 
witness"); United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375, 1384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 869 (1970) ("[T]he limitation is further justified by the fact that [the witness] 
was well known to all defendants and their counsel, having testified at the four 
previous trials. His background was explored in great detail on cross-examination 
and the defense was informed of the nature of [his] recent activities"); United States 
v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1128 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971) 
("In each case defense counsel brought out many facts which might damage credi-
bility: convictions of crimes, pendency of outstanding charges, perjury in other trials, 
exposure to long sentences, hope for leniency from the government • • • • Under 
the circumstances the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.'); United States v. 
Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 971 (1970) ("Since the 
defense had become fully acquainted with Warren's background from materials pro• 
vided ••• they were able to cross-examine him extensively and effectively'). 
78. Apparently, this is also the view of Justice White. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 
U.S. 129, 133-34 (1968) (White, J., concurring): 
In Alford v. United States, • • • the Court recognized that questions which 
tend merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate a witness may go beyond the bounds 
of proper cross-examination. I would place in the same category those inquiries 
which tend to endanger the personal safety of the witness. But in these situations, 
if the question asked is one that is normally permissible, the State or the witness 
should at the very least come fonll'ard with some showing of why the witness 
must be excused from answering the question. The trial judge can then ascertain 
the interest of the defendant in the answer and exercise an informed discretion 
in making his ruling. 
(Emphasis added.) Of course, the withholding of this information would only violate 
the right to confront if effective cross-examination was denied. See United States v. 
Alston, 460 F.2d 48, 50-53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 (1972): 
The substance of Smith and Alford is to assure the admission of background 
that is "an essential step in identifying the witness with his environment," Alford 
v. United States •••• The crucial underpinning of that substance is the likeli-
hood of prejudice to the defendant • • •• 
• • • The critical question is not simply whether or not the witness has 
divulged his home address • • • but whether or not the defendant has been 
given sufficient "opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting,'' Alford 
v. United States [citation omitted]. Thus, while a witness would normally be 
required to answer all questions regarding his or her background, there arc 
exceptions to that requirement. The witness should have the opportunity to dem-
onstrate to the trial judge that his or her home address docs not constitute in• 
formation necessary to "place the witness in his proper setting.'' Put another 
way, the witness should have the opportunity to demonstrate to the trial judge 
that the defendant's solicitation of his or her home address amstitutes only an 
attempt to "harass, annoy or humiliate.'' 
79. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). 
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detract from the conclusion that testimonial privileges cannot con-
stitutionally impinge on effective cross-examination. While the 
Supreme Court's handling of the hearsay cases is subject to some 
uncertainty,80 it is clear that at least two conditions must be met 
before a state may introduce testimony not subject to cross-exami-
nation at trial. First, the state must be unable to produce the witness 
for cross-examination.81 Thus, where the witness has died prior to 
80. The principal uncertainty surrounds the requirement that a witness be un-
available before his hearsay statements may be admitted. Although earlier cases such 
as Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), 
prevented the state from introducing hearsay testimony in the absence of a showing 
that the witness was unavailable, the Court arguably stepped back from this require-
ment in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality decision). In Dutton, the Court 
permitted the admission into evidence of a declaration against penal interest made 
by one of the defendant's co-conspirators, which also incriminated the defendant, 
without discussion of the issue of the co-conspirator's availability. The Court may 
have considered the co-conspirator unavailable in the sense that he would presum-
ably have asserted his fifth amendment privilege if called as a witness. Such an 
assumption, although perhaps warranted when Dutton was decided, might be incor-
rect today in light of the availability of use immunity. See text at notes 71-72 supra. 
Even assuming that the Court considered the co-conspirator available, it would be 
unwarranted to construe Dutton as authoritatively rejecting the unavailability require-
ment. See Comment, The Uncertain Relationship Between the Hearsay Rule and the 
Confrontation Clause, 52 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1167, 1204-06 (1974). There was no' majority 
opinion in Dutton, and even two members of the plurality indicated that they would 
decide the case on the theory of harmless error, reasoning that the admitted state-
ments were so unreliable that the jury could not have considered them seriously. 
400 U.S. at 90 (Black.mun, J., concurring). In the subsequent case of Mancusi v. 
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), the Court inquired into the unavailability of the declar-
ant before finding that the use of the hearsay statement did not violate the defen-
dant's right of confrontation. 408 U.S. at 216. 
81. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968), the Court held that "a witness 
is not 'unavailable' for purposes of the ••• exception to the confrontation require-
ment unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his 
presence at trial." In Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), the Court permitted the 
introduction of a transcript of testimony given at a previous trial by a crucial witness 
who was living in Sweden at the time of trial. The Court found that the rule of 
Barber, which rested on the availability of means to secure the attendance of wit-
nesses from other states, for example, the Uniform Act To Secure the Attendance 
of Witnesses from without a State, federal writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, 
and the established practice of the United States Bureau of Prisons to honor state 
writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, see 408 U.S. at 212, was satisfied by a show-
ing that the state was unable to compel the attendance of a United States citizen 
living abroad. The dissent in Mancusi argued that the majority ignored the require-
ment of Barber that the state make a good-faith effort to secure the presence of the 
witness at trial because the state had made no attempt whatsoever to secure the 
witness' presence, either by requesting the witness to attend voluntarily or by seeking 
federal assistance in invoking the cooperation of Swedish authorities: "I cannot agree 
• • • that if neither state nor federal authorities had the power to compel Holm's 
appearance, that fact relieved the State of its obligation to make a good-faith effort 
to secure his presence. It simply reduced the likelihood that any effort would succeed. 
The State's obligation would hardly be framed in terms of 'good-faith effort' if that 
effort were required only in circumstances where success was guaranteed." 408 U.S. 
at 223 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, although there is doubt as to the vitality of 
the "good-faith effort" requirement of Barber, the state must at least be unable to 
compel the witness' attendance. 
1484 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:1465 
the trial,82 or is outside the country and hence not subject to 
process,88 the witness' prior statements may be introduced even 
though he is not presently subject to cross-examination. Second, the 
out-of-court testimony must bear some "indicia of reliability.''84 For 
example, the testimony of a witness from an earlier hearing is con-
. sidered reliable because the testimony was given under oath and 
subject to cross-examination.85 Similarly, a declaration against in-
terest may be considered reliable because of its spontaneous nature 
and because the speaker generally lacks a motive to lie.86 Both of 
these conditions are unsatisfied when a privilege obstructs cross-
examination. When a state-authorized privilege is asserted, the state 
causes the witness to be unavailable for cross-examination. The fact 
that the Davis court considered this action unfair parallels the hear-
say cases, where the introduction of out-of-court testimony is con-
sidered "unfair" if the state "creates" the unavailability of a witness 
by failing to compel his presence. Additionally, there are no indicia 
of reliability to protect the defendant when cross-examination is 
obstructed by a privilege. No inference of reliability arises from the 
fact that the direct testimony is given under oath.87 Even where the 
testimony consists of statements that might be considered reliable if 
made out of court, such statements lack any inherent spontaneity 
when made on the witness stand. For example, even though decla-
rations against penal interest are considered highly reliable when 
spontaneously made out of court,88 perjury is always a possibility 
when a witness admits criminal liability under oath.80 Thus, the 
situations in which hearsay statements are admitted despite the lack 
of cross-examination provide no basis for concluding that testimonial 
privileges can justify infringements on the right of cross-examination, 
The foregoing analysis has suggested that cross-examination may 
not be restricted where a denial of effective cross-examination would 
82. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895). 
83. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). 
84. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972). Such indicia of rcllability 
arc present in the traditional hearsay exceptions, such as dying declarations, see 
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), prior recorded testimony, see Mattox 
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), and declarations against penal interest. See 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
85. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972). 
86. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). 
87. Cf., e.g., United States v. Jones, 402 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1968); Young v. United 
States, 406 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (grand jury testimony of a witness not admissible 
against the accused); Fender v. Ramsey, 131 Ga. 440, 62 S.E. 527 (1908) (ex parle 
affidavit not admissible against the accused at trial). 
88. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973). 
89. Where a witness admits criminal liability under oath, it is not unlikely that 
his testimony has been exchanged for immunity or leniency. Where such an exchange 
has been made, the possibility suggests itself that the testimony exchanged might 
have been fabricated for the purpose of obtaining favorable treatment. 
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result, and that where the assertion o~ a privilege prevents a defen-
dant from achieving full and effective cross-examination, the defen-
dant's right of confrontation must prevail. In addition to testimonial 
privileges, hearsay rules and narrow standards of relevance can pre-
vent effective cross-examination. In the term prior to the Davis 
decision, the Supreme Court dealt with the hearsay problem in 
Chambers v. Mississippi90 and, in so doing, shed light on the related 
problem of relevance rulings. 
In Chambers, the accused was charged with shooting and killing 
a police officer. By way of defense, Chambers asserted that the shoot-
ing was committed by one Gable McDonald. Chambers presented 
witnesses who testified that McDonald had shot the officer, but 
Chambers' evidence that McDonald had admitted his guilt to these 
witnesses on four separate occasions was excluded as hearsay.91 The 
prosecution failed to call McDonald to testify and the trial court 
refused to allow Chambers to declare McDonald an adverse witness; 
consequently, Chambers was forced to call McDonald as his own 
witness. McDonald repudiated his confessions and gave damaging 
testimony,92 however. Because of the "voucher" rule, which pro-
hibits a party from discrediting his own witness, Chambers was 
prevented from attacking that testimony.93 
The Supreme Court reversed Chambers' conviction, finding con-
stitutional error in the application of the voucher rule to prevent 
cross-examination of McDonald,94 and in the exclusion on hearsay 
grounds of the evidence of McDonald's admissions of guilt.95 In so 
90. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
91. At the time of Chambers' trial, Mississippi did not admit declarations against 
penal interest as exceptions to the hearsay rule. See 410 U.S. at 299. 
92. On direct e.xamination, McDonald admitted having made a sworn confession 
to the defendant's attorney, but upon cross-examination by the state, McDonald repu-
diated his confession, asserting that he had not shot the officer and that he had 
been persuaded to confess by one Reverend Stokes, apparently a friend of Chambers', 
who promised McDonald that he would not go to jail. McDonald then asserted that 
he had not been at the scene of the shooting when it occurred, and gave an alibi. 
93. Chambers v. State, 252 S.2d 217, 218-19 (Miss. 1971). 
94. Because McDonald's testimony on the state's cross-examination had been ad-
verse to the accused, the Court found that Chambers had been "denied an oppor-
tunity to subject McDonald's damning reputation and alibi to cross-examination." 
410 U.S. at 295. 
95. Although the Court grounded its reversal jointly on the denial of cross-exam-
ination and the exclusion of McDonald's admission's, there are indications that either 
ground alone would have been sufficient to compel reversal. After discussing the 
denial of cross-examination of McDonald, the Court concluded that "[t]he 'voucher' 
rule, as applied in this case, plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend 
against the State's charges." 410 U.S. at 298. After discussing the exclusion of the 
hearsay statements, the Court concluded that "where constitutional rights directly 
affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be 
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." 410 U.S. at 302. Lower courts 
relying on Chambers have concluded that either violation alone justifies reversal. See, 
e.g., United States v. Torres, 477 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1973) (conviction reversed where 
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doing, the Court provided a test explaining when the admission of 
hearsay statements favorable to the defendant is constitutionally 
required: 
The testimony rejected by the trial court here bore persuasive assur-
ances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale 
of the exception for declarations against interest. That testimony 
was also critical to Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where 
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt 
are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically 
to defeat the ends of justice. 
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence . . . 
denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental 
standards of due process.9 6 
Chambers is significant because the Court independently assessed 
the reliability of evidence critical to Chambers' defense, rather than 
accepting the state's evaluation of the reliability of the evidence. 
While the decision dealt with the exclusion of evidence on hearsay 
grounds, the reach of the Court's methodology seems clearly to in-
clude other cross-examination restrictions, such as relevance rulings, 
that may deny the defendant the opportunity to present a defense. 
The Chambers Court found error in the "mechanistic application" 
of the hearsay rule to exclude relevant, trustworthy evidence that 
would have had significant impact on the jury. If, instead, Mc-
Donald's declarations against penal interest had been excluded on 
the ground that they lacked probative worth concerning McDonald's 
veracity, the Court's analysis would still have applied. That the evi-
dence was excluded specifically by the hearsay rule is irrelevant 
from the defendant's point of view; his right "to present witnesses 
in his mm defense"97 is compromised whenever relevant, trust-
worthy evidence is excluded. 
The state interests underlying rules of relevance, however, are 
often greater than the rather minimal state interests underlying hear-
say rules. In fact, when hearsay rules keep out reliable probative ev-
idence, as in Chambers, there arguably is no state interest at stake. 
Thus, while Chambers is influential, it is by no means dispositive of 
the situation where relevance rulings inhibit the presentation of an 
effective defense. With regard to the weight that should be given 
defendant was not permitted to impeach his own witness); Kreisher v. State, 303 A,2d 
651, 652 (Del. 1973) ("The hearsay rule may not be applied 'mechanistically' to 
defeat a right and the ends of justice"); Commonwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa, 296, 324 
A.2d 344 (1974) (Chambers requires admission of hearsay statements where circum-
stances provide assurance of reliability). 
96. 410 U.S. at 302-03. 
97. 410 U.S. at 802. See also Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington v, 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
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countervailing state interests, however, Davis is clearly instructive; 
when read with Chambers, Davis mandates that the state interests 
behind relevance rulings, no matter how strong, cannot justify the 
exclusion of cross-examination testimony constitutionally protected 
under the test set forth above. The fact that Chambers and Davis 
considered different aspects of the defendant's constitutional rights 
should not detract from this analysis: Although Davis was grounded 
on the sixth amendment right of confrontation, and Chambers on 
the defendant's right to prepare a defense, the two guarantees are 
indistinguishable in purpose.98 While the right to produce exculpa-
tory testimony guarantees the defendant a chance to prove his inno-
cence affirmatively and the right of confrontation ensures the defen-
dant an opportunity to attack the proof of guilt adduced by the 
prosecution, the essence of each is the guarantee that the criminal 
trial process will not be one-sided. 
Rulings on relevance involve a balancing of the probative worth 
of evidence against considerations such as potential for confusion, 
delay, prejudice, or surprise.99 Where such factors outweigh pro-
bative worth, evidence is excluded. These rulings erroneously ex-
clude probative evidence under two circumstances. First, relevance 
rulings, particularly those based on legislative determinations of pro-
bativeness, often incorrectly assess probative worth. For exam-
ple, some legislatures have limited the types of prior convictions 
that may be used for impeachment to those involving crimen falsi,100 
and have placed time limits on the use of convictions to restrict the 
use of those that are "stale."101 Although such statutes are generally 
motivated out of concern for the defendant who is reluctant to 
98. See Westen, supra note 47, at 156. 
99. Relevant evidence is defined by McCormick. as evidence that "render[s] the 
desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence." McCORMICK, 
supra note 8, § 185, at 437 (emphasis original; footnotes omitted). Traditionally, not all 
relevant evidence is admissible; a trial court must balance the probative worth of evi-
dence against several counterbalancing factors. See text at notes 111-14 infra. See also 
FED. R. Evm. 403: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence.'' 
100. See, e.g., A.I.As. R. CRIM. P. 26(f) ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only 
if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement"); FED. R. Evm. 609(a) (evidence 
of criminal convictions may be admitted to attack the credibility of a witness, but 
only if the crime " ••• was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one 
year ••• and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evi-
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant''). 
101. See, e.g., AI.As. R. CRIM. P. 26(f); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 21 (Supp. 1974); 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 56 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608 (1973). 
See generally Note, Impeachment of the Criminal Defendant by Prior Convictions, 
50 NoTRE DAME LAw. 726, 733 (1975). 
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testify for fear of disclosure of his criminal record,102 they usually 
apply to all witnesses.103 
Davis clearly indicates that these statutes violate a defendant's 
right of confrontation when they preclude inquiry into a witness' 
bias.104 But statutes limiting the admission of prior convictions may 
also raise constitutional questions in so far as they exclude evidence 
not going to bias that is nevertheless probative of a witness' char-
acter for truth and veracity.105 Justice Stewart106 addressed this ques-
tion in his concurrence in Davis by emphasizing that the Court did 
not find a constitutional requirement that, in all instances, evidence 
of criminal convictions be admissible to impeach. This reading of 
102. The rule permitting the impeachment of a witness with all prior felony 
convictions has the undesirable effect of preventing criminal defendants with crim-
inal records from testifying in their own behalf for fear that whatever potential 
benefits may arise from testifying will be outweighed by the prejudicial effect of 
disclosure of their criminal record. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d '163, '168 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 
390 U.S. 1029 (1968). But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 14--305 (Supp. 1970), in which Congress 
legislatively overruled the holdings of Luck and Gordon. 
103. See, e.g., Ar.As. R. CRIM. P. 26(f); FED. R. Evm. 609(a). 
104. A defendant might wish to show, for example, that a witness who had re-
cently been convicted of murder and was awaiting sentencing was testifying and aid-
ing the prosecution in hope of lenient treatment. A statute prohibiting this line of 
cross-examination should violate the confrontation clause. The new Federal Rules of 
Evidence are weak in this regard in that they do not provide specifically for the 
admissibility of evidence tending to show the bias of a witness. See Schmertz &: Cza-
panskiy, Bias Impeachment and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 G1::o. L.J. 
257 (1972). 
105. The character of a witness for truth and veracity is relevant circumstantial 
evidence of the truthfulness of his testimony. A party may attack a witness' character 
by showing evidence of specific misconduct that bears on truth and veracity, by proving 
a low reputation within the community, or by showing that the witness has been 
convicted of a crime. See McCORMICK, supra note 8, §§ 41-44; 3 J. WIG!IIORE, supra 
note 2, §§ 977-88 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). One of the largely unresolved questions in 
the law of evidence concerns the determination of which prior criminal convictions 
may be used to impeach a witness' credibility. Some jurisdictions provide that all con-
victions involving "moral turpitude" should be permitted because knowledge of a 
witness' misdeeds will aid the jury in determining the weight it should give his 
testimony. See Sims v. Callahan, 264 Ala. 216, 112 S.2d 776 (1959); State v. Jenness, 143 
Me. 380, 62 A.2d 867 (1948); Smith v. State, 346 S.W .2d 611 (Tex, Ct. Crim. App, 
1961); McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 43, at 86. See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit, 16, § 56 
(Supp. 1973). Some jurisdictions provide that conviction of all felonies may be used 
to attack character for truth and veracity. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 788 (West 1966), 
Other jurisdictions permit the use of all felonies and also convictions of misdemeanors 
involving deceit (crimen falsi). See Commonwealth v. Kostan, 349 Pa. 560. 37 A,2d 606 
(1944); Fm. R. Evm. 609(a). Another view is that only convictions of crimes in-
volving deceit or false statement are helpful in evaluating the likelihood that the 
witness is being truthful, and that the commission of, for example, a crime of violence 
is not in any way inconsistent with a character of truthtelling. See UNIFORM RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 21. See also Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for 
Reform, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. I, 4-6 (1968); Note, supra note 101; Note, Impeaching the 
Accused by His Prior Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 
919, 927-28 (1968). 
106. See text at note 19 supra. 
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the majority opinion seems accurate if it means merely that the Con-
stitution does not require the admission of irrelevant evidence. But, 
in light of Chambers, it is inaccurate to the extent it suggests that 
probative evidence not going to bias is outside the scope of constitu-
tional protection. Therefore, where a conviction does provide rel-
evant evidence of a witness' truth and veracity, constitutional error 
should result from exclusion.107 For example, a statute forbidding 
the use of perjury convictions would involve an inaccurate assessment 
of the probativeness of prior lying under oath and, applied to a 
criminal case, should be unconstitutional.108 To consider a. more 
realistic example, the Federal Rules of Evidence, as originally pro-
posed, prohibited impeachment with convictions more than ten years 
old.100 Since, arguably, a conviction of perjury always has significant 
probative worth with regard to a witness' credibility, this provision 
as applied to a greater than ten-year-old perjury conviction might 
have been unconstitutional. The potential constitutional problems 
present in such an absolute rule were avoided by the rule as enacted, 
which provides the trial judge with discretion to admit convictions 
greater than ten years old if their probative worth exceeds their 
prejudicial eff ect.110 
107. Cf. Westen, supra note 47, at 150 n.382 ("State (and federal) standards of 
materiality and relevance could conflict with compulsory process if redefined so nar-
rowly as to prevent the defendant from introducing probative evidence 'in his favor' 
that might influence the outcome of the trial."). 
108. The Supreme Court has suggested that the exposure of prior perjury convic-
tions is contitutionally protected. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959): 
[W]here governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonable-
ness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Gov-
ernment's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity 
to show that it is untrue .••• [I]t is even more important where the evidence 
consists of the testimony of individuals ••• who, in fact, might be perjurers •.•. 
We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and 
cross-examination. 
360 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added). Cf. Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975), 
where the petitioner challenged his state criminal conviction on the ground that the 
trial judge had prevented him from attacking the testimony of a prosecution witness 
by establishing that the witness had previously testified falsely at a deposition. The 
court found that it was "an abuse of discretion and a violation of constitutional rights 
to deny to a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness at all on 'a subject matter 
relevant to the witness's credibility,' such as an instance of prior false S1vearing." 510 
F.2d at 225, quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318. 
109. PROP. FED. R. Evm. 609(b) provided: "Evidence of a conviction under this rule 
is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of the 
release of the witness from confinement imposed for his most recent conviction, or the 
expiration of the period of his parole, probation, or sentence granted or imposed with 
respect to his most recent conviction, whichever is the later date." This proposal was 
withdrawn in 1974. 
110. FED. R. Evm. 609(b) provides: 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a 
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of 
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, 
that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circum-
stances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
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The second instance in which rules of relevance may erroneously 
exclude probative evidence is when evidence is excluded because it 
may confuse111 or unfairly prejudice the jury,112 consume an undue 
amount of time,118 or work an unfair surprise on an opponent.114 
Where the exclusion of such probative evidence results in a denial 
of effective cross-examination, however, the state interests supporting 
exclusion conflict with the defendant's right of confrontation. As 
The clause permitting the admission of some convictions more than ten years old 
represents a change made by the Senate. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, 
15 (1974): 
Although convictions over ten years old generally do not have much probative 
value, there may be exceptional circumstances under which the conviction substan-
tially bears on the credibility of the witness. Rather than exclude all convictions 
over 10 years old, the committee adopted an amendment in the form of a final 
clause to the section granting the court discretion to admit any convictions over 
10 years old, but only upon a determination by the court that the probative value 
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially out-
weighs its prejudicial effect. 
Arguably the statute's standard for admission is too narrow to pass constitutional 
muster; it does not permit the admission in evidence of convictions greater than ten 
years old unless probative worth substantially outweighs prejudicial effect. The re-
quirement of substantiality represents a protection for a defendant when he takes the 
stand, but as applied to other witnesses, may impermissibly restrict a defendant's right 
to impeach a prosecution witness. See also Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: 
A. Critique of Rule 6-()9 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 
CRIM. L. BuLL. 330, 339 (1970), where the author points out that the rule admitting 
only convictions of crimen falsi may work an injustice on a defendant in some situa-
tions, and states that "[o]ne solution to this problem would be to have a residual 
clause in the rule to allow for the introduction of crimes other than those involving 
dishonesty that, in the opinion of the trial judge, should be permitted to avoid a 
miscarriage of justice." Id. at 339. 
A further example of statutes that may be drawn too narrowly are the recently 
enacted provisions restricting the cross-examination of complaining witnesses in prose-
cutions for rape. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (Supp. 1975), One of the 
many problems in the successful prosecution of rape cases is the unwillingness of vic• 
tims to bring criminal charges for fear of the searching cross-examination into their past 
sexual behavior traditionally permitted either to attack the complaining witness' 
credibility or to serve as the basis for a defense of consent. MlcH. Co?>IP, LAws ANN, 
§ 750.520j (Supp. 1975) attempts to remedy this situation by providing in part: 
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evi-
dence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's 
sexual conduct shall not be admitted ••• unless and only to the extent that the 
judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in 
the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its 
probative value: 
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor. 
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin 
of semen, pregnancy, or disease. 
While such restrictions encourage the prosecution of rape cases, thus serving a legit-
imate legislative purpose, where relevant evidence is excluded thereby, a defendant's 
right of confrontation is violated in a manner similar to Davis. 
111. See McCoRMicx, supra note 8, § 185, at 439. 
112. See id.; PROP. FED. R. Evm. 403, Advisory Committee's Note (" 'Unfair prejudice' 
within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one"), 
113. See McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 185, at 439-40. 
114. Id. 
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in the situation involving a clash between a privilege and the right
to confront, these state interests should not outweigh the defendant's
constitutional rights. Many of these interests can be satisfied by a
less restrictive alternative, 15 such as limiting instructions by the
judge." 6 The effect of evidence working an unfair surprise on the
prosecution, for example, could be mitigated by granting a continu-
ance." 7 But even if no alternative can be found, evidence that pos-
sesses a significant amount of probative worth should be admitted
notwithstanding its potential for confusing or prejudicing the jury
against the prosecution's case. If a state must choose between admis-
sion and exclusion in a situation where exclusion would prevent the
defendant from introducing testimony with a significant exculpatory
effect, while admission would make it less likely that the jury would
be able to evaluate the issues in a rational manner, the confrontation
clause should be seen as mandating admission.
This treatment of relevance rulings accords with the above read-
ing of Davis. That case indicates that the Court is aware of the crucial
importance of cross-examination to a criminal defendant, and is
willing to strike down obstacles that a state puts in the path of
effective cross-examination. Only when the defendant is permitted
to bring out all possible probative evidence on cross-examination
that may rebut or qualify the testimony of prosecution witnesses
will a criminal trial be consistent with the constitutional require-
ment that the defendant "shall enjoy the right to... be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... ,1 1 8
115. See text at note 70 supra.
116. See PRoP. FE:D. R. Evw. 403, Advisory Committee's Note ("In reaching a decision
whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to
the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruction.')
117. Relying on the preferable alternative of a continuance, the Federal Rules of
Evidence eliminated unfair surprise as a ground for the exclusion of probative evi-
dence. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
118. U.S. CONSr. amend. VI.
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